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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SCM LAND COMPANY,

)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
V S .

•

•

WATKINS & FABER, and
WALTER P. FABER, JR.,

]

Case No. 19172

]

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This case involves the legal effect of an oral
promise for additional office space given by a lessor in
July, 1979 to induce a long-time tenant (Appellant) to sign
a three year written renewal lease for Appellantfs regular
office space in the Newhouse Building.

The regular office

space had been continuously leased by Appellant for many
years prior thereto.

After the written renewal lease for

the regular office space was signed by Appellant, the
lessor sold the building and assigned the written lease to
Respondent.

Respondent then immediately leased under a

long-term written lease the promised additional space to IML
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-2thereby making it impossible to honor the original
lessor's promise to Appellant.

After learning of SCM f s

purchase of the building and the lease to IML, Appellant
notified SCM of the promise,

SCM refused to fulfill

the promise and therefore Appellant terminated the written
renewal lease and moved from the building as of April 1,
1981.

Respondent SCM then commenced this action against

Appellant for rent for the remainder of the term of the
written renewal lease.
DISPOSITION- IN LOWER COURT
The lower court required the jury to find
specific elements of an oral contract or it could
not

return

a

verdict for Appellant.

Because of the

instructions, the jury could not find those specific
elements of an oral contract and returned a verdict for
Respondent.

The lower court entered its judgment against

Appellant requiring Appellant to pay the rent for the
remainder of the lease term together with interest and
attorney fees.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant requests this Court to reverse the
lower court and hold that the lessor f s oral promise was
the consideration for the execution of the written renewal

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-3office lease and that Appellant was entitled to rescind
the lease for failure of the promise.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts pertinent to the issues of this case
are undisputed.

For convenience they have been divided

into numbered paragraphs.
1.

In June, 19 79, Appellant Watkins & Faber had

been a tenant of the Newhouse Building with office space
on the sixth floor for twelve
of written leases.
2.

years under a succession

(R-290; see Exhibit 2-P).

In June, 1979, the owner of the Newhouse

Building was Mr. Richard W. Fischer.

(R-263, 290). Mr.

Kenneth P. Swinton was Mr. Fischer's resident building
manager and agent for negotiating leases.

(R-263, 264,

290) .
3.

The Watkins & Faber lease then in effect was

due to terminate on June 30, 1979 (R-265, 290), and Mr.
Swinton contacted Mr. Walter P. Faber, Jr. several times
during the latter part of June, 1979 in regard to signing
a renewal lease.
4.

(.R-265, 291).

Mr. Faber told Mr. Swinton that Watkins &

Faber needed additional adjacent space on the sixth floor
and would not sign a renewal lease unless the additional
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-4space was promised.
5.

(R-266, 268, 296, also see R-232-33).

At that time, IML was a month-to-month tenant

of the adjacent space on the sixth floor and was planning
to move from the adjacent space to the eleventh floor in
the building.
6.

(R-267, 270, 292).
Mr. Swinton told Mr. Faber that he didn't

think there would be any problem in getting the adjacent
space but that Mr. Fischer, the owner of the building, was
out of town and would have to make the promise when he
returned.

(R-268, 294, also see R-232).
7.

Mr. Swinton then talked to Mr. Fischer

about Watkins & Faber ! s request, and Mr. Fischer ! s
reaction was favorable.
8.

(R-269-70).

A week or so prior to the end of June,

1979, Mr. Swinton delivered the proposed renewal lease
for Watkins & Faber f s regular office space to Watkins &
Faber ! s office.
9.

(R-293, 265-66).

The lease remained in the office of Watkins

& Faber and was not signed by Watkins & Faber until July
9, 1979 when Mr. Fischer returned and discussed with Mr.
Faber Watkins & Faber 1 s position that the firm would not
renew the lease unless the additional space was promised.
(R-297-98).

Mr. Fischer and Mr. Swinton came to Mr. Faber ! s
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-5office on that date and after discussing the situation
Mr* Fischer said he was informed that IML was planning
to move within two or three months and would be moved
from the sixth floor by the end of December, 1979.
(R-295-98).

Mr. Fischer then stated that if Watkins

& Faber would sign the renewal lease for the regular
office space, the adjacent space would be made available
to Watkins & Faber not later than December 31, 19 79.
(R-298).
10.

Also at the time of the promise, Mr.

Fischer, Mr. Swinton and Mr. Faber went into the adjacent
space occupied by IML, discussed Watkins & Faberfs need
for several additional offices, the locations of the
dividing partitions for the additional space, and agreed
that the additional space would be rented at the "going
rate".

(R-272-73, 296, also see R-233-36).

Mr. Faber

then signed the written renewal lease. (R-29 8).

Both

Mr. Swinton and Mr. Faber testified to the above facts.
Mr. Fischer was not present at trial and did not testify.
11.

The written renewal lease does not contain

an integration provision.
12.

(Exhibit 2-P) .

In October, 1979, Mr. Faber was seriously

injured and was hospitalized until sometime in January,
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-61980.

(R-300) < He was thereafter confined to a wheel-

chair and did not return to work full time in 1980.
(R-301).
13.

In 1980, Watkins & Faber periodically

checked the progress of IMLfs remodelling of the eleventh
floor.

(R-284-86, 300, 302).
14.

IML continued its work on the remodelling

of the eleventh floor but had not completed the same and
therefore had not moved by September, 198 0 when Mr.
Fischer sold the building to SCM.
15.

(R-303).

When SCM purchased the building, SCM gave

IML a written long-term lease for the adjacent space on
the sixth floor, and SCM took over the eleventh floor
that IML had been remodelling.

(R-305-06).

The purchase

by SCM and long-term lease to IML were done without
notice to or the knowledge of Watkins & Faber.

4

(R-19 2-9 3,

303-04).
16.

In September, 1980 when Watkins & Faber

{

learned of the sale of the building to SCM and of the
long-term lease for the adjacent space on the sixth floor
between SCM and IML, Watkins & Faber contacted SCM and
informed SCM of Mr. Fischer's promise.
17.

(R-303-06).

Thereafter, in several discussions SCM said
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that Watkins & Faber could not have the adjacent space on
the sixth floor but that SCM would lease to Watkins & Faber
the needed additional office space on another floor.

SCM

also said that if Watkins & Faber still wanted to have all
of its offices on one floor then SCM would lease the entire
fourth floor to Watkins & Faber, and then Watkins & Faber
would be responsible for the excess space which SCM
suggested Watkins &. Faber might be able to sublease to
others.

(R-307-08).
18.

Watkins & Faber notified SCM that such

proposals were not acceptable because Watkins & Faber's
prior experience with the separation of offices had been
unsatisfactory and because of Mr. Faberfs physical
condition. (R-307).

Watkins & Faber moved from the

building on April 1, 1981.
19.

(R-308-10)•

In the fall of 1981, SCM commenced an action

against Watkins & Faber for unpaid rent from and after
April 1, 1981 when Watkins & Faber moved from the building.
20.

The trial court refused to allow the jury to

consider whether the oral promise was consideration for the
execution of the written lease of July 9, 1979.

The lower

court stated to counsel at R-329-30:
. . . And as I pointed out in chambers, the
record ought to reflect that throughout the
litigation and through a good portion of this
trial the defendants have referred to their defense
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-8as a failure of consideration. This court does
not view this matter as a failure of consideration
case, but, rather, an oral contract, the performance of which was a condition precedent.
21.

The trial court instructed the jury that it had

to find certain definite elements of a specific oral contract
for the additional space or it could not return a verdict for
Watkins & Faber. Instructions 16 (R-140) and 17 (R-141)
state as follows:
INSTRUCTION NO. 16.
You must return a verdict for the plaintiff unless
the defendants establish by a preponderance of the
evidence the truth of all of the following propositions:
1. Richard Fischer and Watkins & Faber entered
into an oral contract to enter into a written lease for
additional space on the sixth floor of the Newhouse Building
2. If there was such an oral contract, the oral
contract was intended by the parties to the contract to
be a condition precedent to the written lease agreement
for Suite 606 becoming effective.
3. If there was such an oral contract, it was
breached.
4. If there was such an oral contract and it was
breached, the defendants acted within a reasonable time
after it was breached to rescind the written lease.
INSTRUCTION NO. 17.
For there to be an oral contract, the parties
must express their mutual assent and understanding to
the terms of the contract. This means that the parties
must have arrived at a sufficiently definite understanding
as to the terms so that they knew what they were

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-9bound to do. These terms include the
additional space to be leased, the price
for the additional space, the term for the
additional space, and the remodeling costs
for the additional space.
22.

The parties stipulated and the court ruled

that exceptions could be taken after the jury retired to
deliberate.
23.

(R-326) .
Appellant objected to the lower court's

refusal to use Appellant's requested Special Interrogatories
5, 6 and 9 generally for the reason that Appellant only
needed to prove that there was a promise to provide the
additional space and not that there was an enforceable
contract. (R-331).

Appellant's exceptions to Instructions

16 and 17 go to the issues whether the promise was consideration and whether the lower court in substance improperly
directed the verdict..
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING
TO CONSIDER THE LESSOR'S ORAL PROMISE FOR
ADDITIONAL SPACE AS CONSIDERATION PAID TO
INDUCE APPELLANT TO SIGN THE WRITTEN
RENEWAL LEASE FOR APPELLANT'S REGULAR
OFFICE SPACE.
The written renewal lease would not have been
entered into but for the lessor's oral promise.
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Without

-10notice to or the knowledge of Appellant, Respondent made
it impossible to keep the promise by entering into a longterm lease of the adjacent space to IML.
The lower court concluded that the lessor's oral
promise was not consideration for the written lease and
that the promise itself was of no independent legal benefit
to Appellant unless it was determined to be an enforceable
oral contract containing certain specific elements; if those
elements were established, then the resulting oral contract
was a condition precedent.

In Jury Instruction 18 (R-142),

the lower court stated:
For an oral contract, if any, to be
a condition precedent to a written lease
agreement, the oral contract must have
been intended by the parties to be fully
performed before the written lease agreement was to become effective and binding.
In this case, however, the performance of the written lease
was begun solely because of the promise and was begun months
prior to any anticipated performance of the promise.

Thus,

the promise itself had independent legal significance and
was the condition under which Appellant signed the lease.
Even though several legal doctrines might be
applicable in some degree to the oral promise in this case,
it seems clear that the promise itself was a condition and
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-11would qualify as consideration under Utah law and provable
by parol evidence.
be applicable.

Several recent Utah cases appear to

In FMA Financial Corporation W

Hansen

Dairy, Inc., et al,, 617 P.2d 327 (Utah 1980), FMA sued
Hansen for an alleged breach of a written lease of a silo
and farm equipment.

Hansen asserted the defense that the

silo was not installed by harvest time as orally agreed.
In FMA the lower court determined there was a complete
failure of consideration because of failure to keep the
oral agreement.

As a result, the lessee, Hansen, did not

have to continue the written lease.

FMA appealed on the

ground that the written lease agreement was integrated and
did not provide when the construction of the silo was to
be completed.

FMA urged that the parol evidence rule

prevented Hansen from proving that the silo was to be
installed by harvest time.

FMA also argued that Hansen

knew that the silo had not been timely installed but
thereafter acknowledged in writing that the silo was complete.
In response to FMA's assertion of the parol evidence rule
and FMAfs objection to the oral agreement, this court
stated as follows:
The standard parol evidence rule is
that extraneous evidence may not be used to
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*

contradict or vary the terms of a written
instrument. That rule serves a useful
purpose in appropriate circumstances in
safeguarding the integrity of such documents. However, it should not be applied
with any such unreasoning rigidity as to
defeat what may be shown to be the actual
purpose and intent of the parties, but
should be applied in the light of reason
to serve the ends of justice. It does not
preclude proof of agreements as to collateral
matters relating to the contract or its
performance, so long as they are not inconsistent with nor in repudiation of the terms
of the written agreement. Nor does it prevent
proof that a party did not perform an
obligation which it was understood and agreed
by the parties was a condition precedent
to the contract becoming effective. That
applies to the circumstances here, where the
court found that the parties had an understanding and agreement that in order for the
silo to be useful to the defendants it was
to be installed by harvest time, and that
this was an essential to the contract
becoming effective. 617 P.2d 329.

This court also found no basis to upset the lower court's
holding that:
. . . there had been a failure to furnish
the agreed consideration by the plaintiff
[FMA] and that therefore, the defendants
[Hansen] were not bound to continue making
payments on the contract. 617 P.2d 3 30.
In Nielsen, et al. v. MFT Leasing, et al., 6 56
P.2d 454 (Utah 1982), Nielsen sued MFT to rescind a written
equipment lease for failure of consideration.
claimed for rental amounts.

MFT counter-

The lower court granted a

rescission on the ground that there was a complete failure
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-13of consideration because MFT did not provide the exact
equipment described in the lease*

MFT had apparently

purchased the equipment from Pursinger and leased the
equipment to Nielsen.

The equipment was delivered by

Pursinger and Nielsen acknowledged delivery.

MFT argued

that Nielsen should not have been allowed to adduce parol
evidence of failure of consideration because it contradicted the terms of the written lease.

This court

stated that:
Evidence of failure of consideration
does not vary or alter the terms of a contract; it attacks the very existence of the
contract for the purpose of proving it
unenforceable. 656 P.2d 456.
Consideration may be found in many forms and
under a wide variety of circumstances.

In Sugarhouse Finance

Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Utah 1980), this court
stated:
No completely satisfactory and comprehensive definition of "consideration"
has ever been devised. It is generally
agreed, however, that where a promise is
supported by the incurrence, on the part
of the promisee, of a legal detriment in
order to confer a benefit on the promisor,
such is sufficient to serve as consideration,
thereby rendering the promise legally
enforceable. 610 P.2d 1369, 1372.
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-14Certainly, anything of value may be deemed consideration•
For something to be consideration, it need not have the
elements of an oral contract.
In another case, General Insurance Company of
America v. Carnicero Dynasty Corporation, 545 P.2d 502,
504 (Utah 1976), this court stated:
There is a distinction between lack
of consideration and failure of consideration.
Where consideration is lacking, there can be
no contract. Where consideration fails, there
was a contract when the agreement was made,
but because of some supervening cause, the
promised performance fails. 545 P.2d 502, 504.
Under the facts of this case, the promise itself
must be considered as having legal significance and identity
apart from its later performance, if any.

It is submitted

that the Lessor1s oral promise given in July, 19 79 was the
condition and consideration for the signing of the written
renewal lease. Without the promise, there would have
been no written lease.

It would be clearly unfair to com-

pel performance of the lease and yet deny the promise which
brought the lease into being.
POINT II.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING
THE JURY THAT UNLESS IT FOUND AN ENFORCEABLE
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-15ORAL CONTRACT, IT COULD NOT RETURN A
VERDICT FOR APPELLANT.
The lower court erroneously refused to even allow
the concept of consideration and did not even use the word
"promise" or the word "consideration" in its instructions.
In Instruction 16 (R-140), the lower court
stated that the jury could not return a verdict for
Appellant unless the jury found the following four
propositions to be true: (1) that there was an oral
contract for the additional space; (2) that the oral
contract was a condition precedent to the written lease;
(3). that the oral contract was breached; and (4) that
Appellant acted to rescind the lease within a reasonable
time.
Instruction 17 (R-141) provides that there could
not be an oral contract unless four specific elements
were established; i.e., the additional space to be leased,
the price, the term, and the remodeling costs.
The lower court then stated in Instruction 13
(R-142), that the oral contract, if any, could not be a
condition precedent unless it was intended "to be fully
performed before the written lease agreement was to become
effective and binding."
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-16It is submitted that under the above instructions
the jury could not return a verdict for Appellant regardless that the written renewal lease would never have
existed if the promise had not been made.

The lessor's

agent confirmed that the promise was made to induce the
signing of the written lease.

Instead, the lower court

required a specific oral contract as a condition precedent.
The lower court's instructions thus nullified the promise
and essentially directed the jury to return a verdict for
SCM.

Such a result is contrary to the legal principles

set forth in the FMA and Nielsen cases cited above,
POINT III.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
ALLOWING APPELLANT THE ALTERNATIVE
REMEDY TO TERMINATE THE WRITTEN LEASE
FOR FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION EVEN IF
THE COURT DETERMINED THAT APPELLANT
COULD NOT SPECIFICALLY ENFORCE THE
ORAL PROMISE.
Through its Instructions 16 and 17 (R-140, 141)
and Special Interrogatories (R-153-54) the lower court
determined that unless there was an enforceable oral contract, Appellant could not prevail.

After the jury determined

there was no oral contract, Special Interrogatories B, C
and D were irrelevant.

The lower court rejected the argument
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-17that the promise itself was consideration and therefore
refused to allow Appellant the alternative remedy of
rescinding the lease upon repudiation of the promise.
Even assuming that the promise might not have
been specifically enforceable by Appellant for any reason
such as the Statute of Frauds or absence of specific
contract provisions, rescission is available if the
promise was consideration for Appellant's signing of
the lease.

This court has discussed the definition and

impact of failure or lack of consideration in the FMA,
Nielsen, Sugarhouse Finance, and the General Insurance
cases cited above, and is in accord with the decisions in
other jurisdictions.

In 17 C.J.S. Contracts §129, pages

849-50, there is a general discussion of lack or failure
of consideration as follows:
It is laid down in a number of cases that
when the consideration for a promise wholly fails
the promise is without consideration and
unenforceable; but this must mean that in a
contract with an executory consideration, the
execution of the consideration is a condition
precedent to the liability on the promise, and
the failure to execute the consideration discharges the promisor. Where there is a total
failure of consideration and defendant has
derived no benefit from the contract, or none
beyond the amount of money which he has already
advanced, such failure of consideration may be
shown in bar of the action. . . ,
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-18Section 399 of the Restatement of the Law of
Contracts sets forth the principle that a total failure
to receive the agreed exchange for the performance of
a promisor*s contractual duty discharges that duty.
In the instant case, the promise for the
additional space was clearly the consideration for the signing
of the lease. Where the consideration was repudiated,
the appropriate remedy was rescission.
POINT IV.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING
THE JURY TO CONSIDER ON THE ISSUE OF
MITIGATION OF DAMAGES LOST RENT ON
ANOTHER FLOOR WHEN THERE WAS NO LEASE
IN FORCE AND CHARGE THE SAME TO
APPELLANT.
The Norwest lease for the third floor was to
terminate on April 30, 1982 (Exhibit 3-P). Even assuming
that SCM acted reasonably in allowing Norwest to vacate
the area on the third floor and move to the area on the
sixth floor, SCM' would not be entitled to charge Appellant
rent on the third floor for the months of May and June,
1982 because Norwest was not obligated to pay rent for
those months.

In Exhibit 7-P, SCM claims credit for Norwest

rent for the months of May and June, 19 82.

Appellant

objected to the admission of Exhibit 7-P in regard to the
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-19Norwest rent. (R-215).

Under no circumstances is SCM

entitled to credit for the $1,434.00 rent plus interest
therein awarded for those months.
POINT V.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING
STATUTORY INTEREST AT A RATE OF TEN
PERCENT (10%) ON A LEASE MADE PRIOR TO
MAY 14, 1981.
Section 15-1-1, U.C.A. 1953 (1981 Supp.) provides
as follows:
15-1-1. LEGAL RATE. The legal rate
of interest for the loan or forbearance of
any money, goods, or things in action shall
be 10% per annum. But nothing herein contained shall be so construed as to in any
way affect any penalty or interest charge
which by law applies to delinquent or
other taxes or to any contract or obligations made before the 14th day of May,
1981.
Any obligation by Appellant to pay rent originates
in the 19 79 lease.

The above amended statute prohibits

charging of interest above the prior statutory rate of six
percent on contracts or obligations made before May 14, 1981.
The lower court allowed interest of ten percent on rent due
after May 14, 1981 as verified by letter of March 21, 1983
from SCM's counsel which letter is included in the record
by stipulation between counsel.

The letter was apparently

inadvertently not included in the record compiled by the
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-20District Court Clerk but is now located immediately following
page 177 of the Record,
CONCLUSION
It is undisputed that Appellant would not have
entered into the written lease without the promise of
additional space.

The promise was clearly the bargained

for consideration given by the original lessor which induced
Appellant to incur the obligation of renewing the written
lease.

It would be fundamentally unfair and contrary to

law to allow SCM to compel performance and receive benefits
under the written lease and ignore the failure of the
promise which brought the lease into being.

In this

situation, the appropriate, fair and legal remedy is rescission
of the lease.
Respectfully submitted this 30th day of June, 19 83.
WATKINS & FABER

By

V k u ^ w

^iM49P

~

Brian W. Burnett
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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